• Resolved Scott Arciszewski

    (@sarciszewski)


    So, you have this query here:

    $tablerows = $wpdb->get_results( "SELECT <code>login_id</code>, <code>login_ip</code>,<code>login_attempts</code>,<code>attempt_time</code>,<code>locked_time</code> FROM  <code>$tablename</code>   WHERE <code>login_ip</code> =  '$ip'  ORDER BY <code>login_id</code> DESC LIMIT 1 " );

    The variable $ip is populated by this function

    function getip(){
                       if (!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'])) {
                        $ip = $_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'];
                    } elseif (!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'])) {
                        $ip = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'];
                    } else {
                        $ip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
                         if($ip=='::1'){
                             $ip = '127.0.0.1';
                         }
                    }
                    return $ip;
                }

    So if someone sends an X-Forwarded-For HTTP header with a malicious SQL injection payload, they could overwrite your query and hack your database.

    https://wordpress.org/plugins/wp-limit-login-attempts/

Viewing 8 replies - 1 through 8 (of 8 total)
  • Plugin Author Arshid

    (@arshidkv12)

    Added more security in new version .
    Thank you 🙂

    Moderator Ipstenu (Mika Epstein)

    (@ipstenu)

    🏳️‍🌈 Advisor and Activist

    While we appreciate you informing plugin developers of this, we ask you not publicly disclose security issues like this in the public venue of the forums for a couple reasons.

    1) We can’t actually promise that anyone will notice it in a reasonable time.

    2) Not all developers are responsible and monitor the forums regularly.

    3) Public disclosure runs a higher risk of the hack being let loose in the wild before the developer has a reasonable chance to validate and patch the issue.

    Because of that, we ask you contact the plugin review team at plugins@wordpress.org – If you chose to publicly release on your own site, we’re not about to try and stop you. At the same time, we have the ability to email developers directly and, if needed, patch their plugin for them. So you will actually get a faster result than you would posting here and hoping someone notices promptly.

    From https://wordpress.org/about/security/

    When a plugin vulnerability is discovered by the WordPress Security Team, they contact the plugin author and work together to fix and release a secure version of the plugin. If there is a lack of response from the plugin author or if the vulnerability is severe, the plugin/theme is pulled from the public directory, and in some cases, fixed and updated directly by the Security Team.

    We understand the concept of ‘my bug, I decide how to report it’ but in this case, it’s not going to get things patched faster.

    Please review our documentation on how to report security issues with WP (and plugins): https://make.wordpress.org/core/handbook/testing/reporting-security-vulnerabilities/#where-do-i-report-security-issues

    We prioritize ALL security reports above everything else in plugin land, and we directly contact developers pretty much daily. Furthermore, we take the extra step of giving the plugin a full re-review for any thing else we might have missed, just in case. Obviously it’s not perfect, but we try.

    Please. Email us. We will make SURE the developer gets the memo and it gets addressed. We have the power. Let us wield it for you.

    Thread Starter Scott Arciszewski

    (@sarciszewski)

    Okay. I’ll email you 24 hours before public disclosure. My previous coordinated disclosure time table of 30 days was counter-productive, but maybe immediate full disclosure isn’t the right answer.

    Moderator James Huff

    (@macmanx)

    Volunteer Moderator

    Or, maybe give them the time they need to fix the issue before you become the one who releases it to the wild, thus creating the danger you hoped to avoid by identifying the vulnerability in the first place?

    Publicly disclosing a security vulnerability doesn’t make code spontaneously happen, all it does is immediately endanger everyone using it.

    When you publicly disclose a security vulnerability, you aren’t the hero saving the day, you’re the villain who has just put everyone’s site (and sometimes their livelihoods) in the line of fire.

    Please don’t be the villain, be the hero. Disclose responsibly by disclosing privately. 🙂

    Thread Starter Scott Arciszewski

    (@sarciszewski)

    When you publicly disclose a security vulnerability, you aren’t the hero saving the day, you’re the villain who has just put everyone’s site (and sometimes their livelihoods) in the line of fire.

    Every security expert disagrees.

    https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2007/01/schneier_full_disclo.html

    Moderator Jan Dembowski

    (@jdembowski)

    Forum Moderator and Brute Squad

    I’m afraid that’s not the case, almost all reputable security experts want and advocate responsible disclosure.

    Yes, Bruce Schneier is one of the top experts and among the most knowledgable and experienced. But cherry picking your favorite doesn’t change a simple fact: just finding and spilling the beans without taking into account the result doesn’t help anyone.

    I’m glad that’s something that you do seem to get.

    Okay. I’ll email you 24 hours before public disclosure. My previous coordinated disclosure time table of 30 days was counter-productive, but maybe immediate full disclosure isn’t the right answer.

    Emphasis is mine. 😉 Thank you for trying to disclose responsibly.

    Thread Starter Scott Arciszewski

    (@sarciszewski)

    Emphasis: Immediate. I’m still going to disclose publicly.

    Also, can we please 86 the meme that coordinated disclosure is responsible? Full disclosure can be responsible too, as can non-disclosure. Context matters a lot here.

    Moderator Jan Dembowski

    (@jdembowski)

    Forum Moderator and Brute Squad

    Right. We get that and all you’re being asked to do is be responsible.

    This was disclosed and I’m 86’ing this topic by closing it.

Viewing 8 replies - 1 through 8 (of 8 total)
  • The topic ‘SQL Injection Vulnerability’ is closed to new replies.